Is the solar storm possible?

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Don't want to only be catastrophists I better be realistic, it is true that the population has already begun to hear things that are not "normal" but really captures the sense of these things?
We can ask ourselves... could be a solar storm of this caliber can reach?, mmm, yes we have proof of that. Even so we better should be prepared or at least warned. And if we really believe that it could happen something, we could prepare ourselves a little.
In February 2010 took place in installations of NOAA in Boulder, Colorado, a joint Atlantic mock extreme solar storm between NASA and European Commission, to test what the capabilities of management of the phenomenon. Its outcome was clear: a technological power outage in large areas of Europe and the US, in just 5 days from the beginning of the detection of the phenomenon on the surface of the Sun, taken as a condition of the drill.

Noted the failure of the drill and the inadequacy of measures to tackle the situation, NASA and European Commission made strong recommendations to the various States of Europe and the US in different ways. (Spain is to refrained from entering)
Including the request for the implementation of public information campaigns focusing on the consequences which could have an extreme solar storm, and, in particular, in the concrete preparations that would be recommended that adopt families in case of hypothetical prolonged loss of electrical power, heating, running water and food stocks in large urban centres.

The information campaign, they said, should be done drawing the pull of social networks like facebook and twitter"," to promote its dissemination and Governments should get underway, in addition, a national Office of citizen attention.

About to be fulfilled 2 years of this major Atlantic exercise, in which was not Spain, since the space climate Observatory wanted to draw attention to this fact and remember what might be some of the potential effects on the population of an event considered to be of high impact but low probability, High Impact Low frequency Event (HILF), and concrete before that preventive measures were being taken in other countries with our exact geographical latitude and degree of exposure, such as Portugal.

The "Carrington event" of 1859, which, as you pointed out, NASA could repeat "in 100 days or 100 years" Remember, in addition, more than a problem of the Sun that observes its normal operation is a systemic problem of our networks and new technologies, that they have not taken sufficiently into consideration this type of natural hazard in their development of recent decades, which would make us vulnerable, at the expense of a repeat a certain type of trigger geomagnetic solar phenomenon, as the "Carrington event" of 1859, which, as you pointed out, NASA could repeat "in 100 days or in 100 years".

Ask, therefore, the adoption of comprehensive national measures and permanent character, taken from now as a normal preventive option as they are doing France, Germany, Portugal, Italy, and other 10 European countries in our area.
The anticipation of the "E3" component of the electromagnetic pulse, have wanted to point out, while it is generally acknowledged in the event of severe geomagnetic storm, as the Quebec in 1989.

The following description of possible consequences for the civilian population after those "5 days" from the beginning of the phenomenon is based on the reports on the risks of the spatial climate of OECD, Civil protection of Germany, independent of the Lloyd's insurance and Allianz reports, the report of the Academy of Sciences American commissioned by NASA, in the report "in the dark"": military planning for catastrophic for infrastructure technology event" of the northern command of U.S. Army, in the recent report of the British Parliament, November 2011 and in the latest report of the Group of experts for the European Commission just a few weeks ago.

All of them are fully available in the disclosure page has opened the Observatory (
Finally this estimate includes only the anticipation of the "E3" component of the electromagnetic pulse, they have tried to point out, while it is generally acknowledged in the event of severe geomagnetic storm, as the Quebec in 1989. It is not included, therefore, estimation of involvement of electronic elements separate or disconnected network, have or not padded faraday under E1 and E2 components of the pulse of artificial origin, that only some report timely, as in the United States Army, taken into consideration for a hypothetical solar EMP.

Once triggered the EMP solar is commonly recognized that the situation of collapse could range from just a few hours or a few days to 2 years, and may have a scope continental multi (1859 Carrington event), national or regional (example of this last case of Quebec from 1989), depending on different circumstances.

Possible immediate effects from the outbreak of the "solar EMP", 5 days after the solar phenomenon:

1- Possible increase in air accidents. Involvement of the air traffic may need to develop protocols for emergency landings recognized by the authorities of the United States and United Kingdom.

2-Possible increase in the accident rate and traffic of means of transport by rail (trains, trams, but also meters in large cities) due to failure of electrical signals and semaphores.

3- Possible trigger of different fire electrically, as verified in the Carrington event of 1859, with the added difficulty of the possible parallel afectacio of the media anti fire. The possibility of large fires multiple and simultaneous may pose great difficulties for a proper orderly evacuation of certain areas (especially above all this, the OECD report "Geomagnetic storms").

4- General failure of industrial power. Possible triggering of industrial accidents, in refineries, chemical, etc, depending on the adequacy of its shutdown protocols plants, reservations diesel emergency, etc.

5- General failure also from the power supply to homes: failure from electric lighting up the power plugs which are refrigerators, electric cookers, microwave, modem for internet, radio, laptop or television. Or recommended air conditioning systems for vulnerable populations in the event of high temperatures and heat waves.

6- Possible involvement of the operation of lifts, forklifts, and other electrical lifting systems; possible increase in accidents and the proliferation of situations of people trapped, specified rescue throughout the cities. The difficulties of evacuation of the building should be taken into consideration to in bed or persons with reduced mobility, if verified non-operation of the lifts.

7- Possible cut of the potable water supply above the second floor of buildings on failure to pumping. Low plants supply network prexistente would continue for pure effect of pressure, while you have and the severity.

8-Possible inability to supply fuel from tanks and service stations, due to failure of electric pumps (notably on this aspect, civil protection Germany report).

9-Possible immediate fall of mobile telephone networks. Possibly few hours would eventually decided the rest of telephony and radio, greatly hindering the management to inform the citizenship and attempting - after the event — the clear recommendations which, unfortunately, were not before the same.

10-Possible inability to cash withdrawal at ATMs, possible disappearance of electronic banking, financial or tax not protected databases to EMP.

Cumulative effects within the 72 hours:

1- Possible depletion of stocks emergency diesel of nuclear plants, on the assumption that own EMP not has already generated other incidents by affectation of transformers or systems, as it was found after the solar storm of Quebec.
Possibly nuclear reactors not could continue cooling the several weeks that are still needed after an emergency shutdown. As it has been made public their reservations current diesel does not exceed 48 hours, nor has the everyday basic supplies will require those who are operating plants during all those weeks possible failure of communications and uncertainty.
In this regard with the situation of 8 Spanish nuclear reactors, must also be taken into consideration, at least the possible situation of 58 French civilian nuclear reactors and other nuclear facilities on our northern border.

2- Possible depletion of stocks of hospitals emergency diesel equipped only with, in general, of autonomy for a few days.

Now possible:

(abreakdown of all the vaccine cold chain.

(b) possible failure of the dialysis, ICU and other life support systems dependent on electricity.

(c) General failure of all electrical instruments that lacks independent power, and even own the building lighting.(above all this, in particular, the report of Civil protection in Germany).

3-Possible collapse of sewer services and waste treatment in large cities.

(aPossible sewage output to surface since the 72 hours in some large cities, triggering new risks to public health.

(b) Possible proliferation of improvised beetles, use of rivers giving foot to other possible undue pollution.

(c) Possible termination of the public waste disposal service. The growing accumulation of rubbish will not but result in a cumulative risk for public health as they go through the weeks and serve very combustible Tinder for new accidental fires.

4-Possible cessation of supply to urban areas.
Let get the flotilla of hundreds of trucks, aircraft and large boats that keep our cities supplied daily. Depletion of stocks such as mineral water, food, blankets, or lanterns on the shelves of retailers. The roads in and out of the cities can also be see progressively colapsadas by traffic accidents and vehicles that have been left without fuel, abandoned.

5- Possible failure of gas pipelines and distribution of the gas supply lines. Associated with failure of domestic heating. If it is winter in less than a week continued without heating the ambient temperature over-valued greatly, making it difficult to reside therein. Recourse to fires improvised by persons without experience can give rise to new urban fires, in the context of possible depletion before referral of technical means fire.

6-Potential problems of public safety, on the basis of the intrinsic difficulty of coordinating security forces and bodies of assistance without phones or electrical means. At the beginning who has money in cash purchase as you can since cards cannot be used either to pay, but before or after, the basic needs of the population can lead that worse if it is not being minimally staffed. Possible attempts at looting and triggering of potential situations of public around supermarkets disorder and the search for mineral water and food supply.
Of reaching a situation of looting, possible follow-up of the scheme of "spiral of looting" in the center of the city to its periphery, were small neighborhood shops, houses temporarily unoccupied... According to the scheme. In the absence of notifications from the authorities fear, rumors of all kinds, and the fact that nobody really know for certain that what has podicio pass in reality it will only lead to all this with the elapse of the days.

7-Possible failures of security in prisons which aggravates the insecurity. Electric locks, security cameras, and other devices failed to exhaust reserves diesel, which have them. Even where this is not the shortage of food stocks so sooner or later they generate riots to a personal overset and which can not find out what is happening in their own homes. It won't be the only staff that you pass that, some will remain in their posts with firmness, reached a certain point and without communications others do not.
The appearance of power failure aspect was documented, e.g. in the techniques Conference in Madrid where a simple general blackout came to compromise the security of a Spanish prison for a few hours according to public release later own officials, fortunately without knowledge of inmates during that short time. Possibly thousands of prisoners of very different types and with different capacities of violence remain free (e.g. Haiti) before security forces already exceeded and, like the rest, looking for their livelihood.

8- Possible progressive depletion of the stock of food and water reserves in homes for the elderly, hospitals, juvenile detention centres and reception centres, given the large number of persons to which they should be addressed.

9- Possible presentation of mild early symptoms of dehydration due to lack of drinking water by some more vulnerable sectors. After the failure of the large plants that supply cities - but depend on electricity-; after emptying all possible drinking water accumulated in pipes, finished mineral water of the stocks of stores that is has been able to buy etc, a person can susbistir in lathe tres-cinco days without drinking water.

10- Possible increase, progressive, of course water to cease its massive industrial exploitation and pumping to the cities. Certain areas of rivera can be seen gradually flooded, water infrastructures must deal with the progressive increase in channels through mechanisms not electric or diesel systems.

The problem is fed back. Possible previous, already pointed, urban sewerage systems collapse may also hinder evacuation of heavy rains or floods, adding an associated risk of flooding in certain places and the entry into coontacto of clean water with dirty water, contaminating the first way difficult to prevent from there.

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